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ABSTRACT
Even though Lithuania’s household income inequality is among the
highest in the European Union (EU), little empirical work has been
carried out to explain such disparities. We investigate it using the
EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions sample microdata.
We confirm that income inequality in Lithuania is high compared
to the EU average. Our decompositions reveal that the number of
employed household members in Lithuania’s households affects
income inequality more as compared to the EU. It is related to a
larger labour income, and self-employment income, in particular,
contribution to inequality in Lithuania. Moreover, taxes, social
contributions, and transfers reduce income inequality in Lithuania
less than in the EU. Specifically, income taxes and social
contributions are less progressive while transfers constitute a
smaller share of income in Lithuania than in the EU. Income taxes
and social contributions are effectively regressive for the self-
employed in Lithuania.
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Income inequality in Lithuania has been one of the largest in the EU and is still growing.
Specifically, the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income, a common measure of
inequality, stood at 36.9% in 2018 for Lithuania (Eurostat, 2020). This was the second-
largest Gini coefficient among the surveyed EU countries, second to Bulgaria, and
exceeded the EU average income inequality by over 6 Gini points. Additionally, income
inequality in Lithuania has increased by 5 Gini points since 2012. All this happened in
the context of more general concern over rising income inequality within major countries
(Atkinson & Piketty, 2010; OECD, 2011, 2015a, 2015b) and increasing empirical evidence
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that income inequality may hinder economic growth (Aghion et al., 1999; Cingano, 2014;
Grigoli & Robles, 2017; Ostry & Berg, 2011; Ostry et al., 2014). The size and dynamics of
income inequality in Lithuania along with warnings about its possible negative conse-
quences encouraged political and economic debate in Lithuania. There was an interest
to re-examine whether income inequality in Lithuania is indeed one of the largest
within the EU, what contributes to income inequality, and what policy could be efficient
at reducing it. This study focuses on these questions: how confident are we in claiming
that Lithuania’s income inequality is high, what factors lay behind such inequality and
howmuch can redistribution of direct taxes and public transfers reduce income inequality.
We first analysed the extent to which income inequality is high. Even though the Gini of
equivilised income does suggest this, a high Gini is not sufficient for such a claim. Besides
the issue of estimating standard errors and testing for different equivalent scales, which
can also change the ranking of countries according to income inequality (Buhmann
et al., 1988), the Gini index itself is subject to criticism. This is because the Gini index,
just like any summary inequality measure, entails social judgements on the undesirability
of inequality (Atkinson, 1970). Specifically, the Gini is more sensitive to inequalities in the
middle of the distribution rather than the tails. This is not necessarily a desirable property,
especially for Lithuania, where the highest level of inequality was found in the tails
(IMF, 2016).
For this reason, we employed several statistical tests to examine whether we can claim
that equivalised income inequality in Lithuania is one of the highest across the EU. First, we
have evaluated the sampling errors to verify that conclusions from the sample data do not
contradict the actual situation. Rao et al. (1992) bootstrapped standard errors based on
survey design information reconstructed according to Goedemé (2013) and Zardo and
Goedemé (2016) allow to estimate the likely biases. Second, we have adjusted household
income by alternative equivalence scales. We use the OECD-modified equivalence scale
and the square root equivalence scale. Third, we have calculated inequality with other
summary measures, thereby explicitly focusing on different segments of the distribution
rather than the middle. We have estimated inequality using alternative measures to the
Gini index: the Atkinson index and the Generalized entropy index as in Jenkins (2017)
with standard inequality preference parameter values. We found that income inequality
is statistically larger than the income inequality in other countries regardless of the equiv-
alence scale or the summary measure used. This also strengthens the following analysis
which is based on the Gini index.
Next, we have investigated why equivalised income inequality is higher compared to
other countries using univariate factor and subgroup decompositions that decompose
inequality into parts. These decompositions are purely statistical: they do not incorporate
agent responses to any covariate. Nevertheless, these decompositions help identify the
households amongst which inequality is acute and suggest which aspects should be
looked into deeper.
Factor component decomposition decomposes inequality measure by disaggregating it
into mutually exclusive and exhaustive income components, for example, labour and
capital income. Two versions of this method are well known: the natural decomposition
as in Shorrocks (1982) that focuses on the decomposition of the variance and the
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) decomposition that is used to decompose the Gini coefficient.
We use the latter method, as the Gini is a more conventional index of inequality. This
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method was used by, for example, Garner and Terrell (1998) to examine income inequality
in Slovakia and Czechia in the early transition period.
Subgroup decomposition decomposes inequality measures within and between
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subgroups, for example, inequality between males
and females and inequality amongst males and amongst females. There are many ways
to decompose subgroups as illustrated in Cowell (2011) and Yitzhaki and Lerman
(1991). We apply the Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) method to decompose the Gini in a
way that is closer to the chosen factor decomposition technique.
From the decompositions, we see that labour income inequality is much higher in
Lithuania than elsewhere in Europe. Additionally, in line with previous findings (e.g. IMF,
2016), the tax and public transfers system plays less of a redistributive role in Lithuania
than in other countries. To understand why, we looked into marginal effects: how does
a 1% change in tax and transfers affect income inequality. We also looked into redistribu-
tive effects: how much do taxes and transfers reduce inequality according to Kakwani
(1977). Finally, we decompose the redistributive effect into the progressivity index and
the average rate of tax and public transfers and compare this with that of the EU. This
lets us calculate how much can inequality be reduced due to a change in progressivity
and average tax and public transfer rates.
Overall, our results suggest that equivalised income inequality in Lithuania is one of the
highest in the EU and this finding is robust to various statistical tests. The decompositions
reveal large inequalities between and within many groups of households in Lithuania. The
largest inequalities lie between the employed and the rest of the population, and this kind
of inequality has been rising over time. Inequalities within the unemployed and those
working in the agricultural sector are particularly distinct. The factor decomposition
shows that labour income, especially self-employment income, is more unequally distrib-
uted in Lithuania than elsewhere. Public transfers and taxes seem to reduce income
inequality in Lithuania less than in other countries. This is because taxes and public trans-
fers in Lithuania are less progressive and the tax and public transfer rates are lower than in
the EU. Income taxes and social contributions are effectively regressive for the self-
employed in Lithuania unlike in the EU. It is found that to reduce income inequality in
Lithuania via redistribution, the focus should be placed on increasing the progressivity
of taxes and average public transfer rates.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we give definitions of income and
describe the data set used throughout the empirical investigation. The other three sec-
tions answer three research questions, each using its methodology and provide comments
on the results. The final section concludes.
2. Definitions and data on income
We focus on equivalised disposable income inequality. Let us explain each term in more
detail. Income is defined as a yearly disposable income. To get the disposable income we
subtract taxes and social contributions from gross income. We include the social contri-
butions of the employee and employer, as we see both of them affecting the demand for
labour. In addition, a new law in 2019 requested employees to pay the majority of
employees’ social contributions (see SODRA, 2020). Gross income is the sum of market
income (labour income with social insurance contributions and capital income) and
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transfers (both private and public). In cases when we refer to public transfers to analyse
redistribution, we add private transfers to the definition of market income. The unit of
observation is a household. This assumes that household members share their income
and make joint decisions. To adjust for household size, an equivalence scale is used.
Focusing on equivalised income rather than individual income affects the results and
this should be briefly justified. Research literature suggests that individuals make econ-
omic decisions taking themselves as well as their household members into consideration
(see, among others, Vogler & Pahl, 1994). For example, the income of all household
members comprises a common budget constraint (Chiappori & Meghir, 2015) thereby
influencing each household member’s behaviour. Additionally, some transfers are only
granted at a household level (e.g. social assistance transfer) making the allocation of
this transfer to any specific member artificial. Nevertheless, each household member
has their preferences and a typically unequal control of the household’s budget with evi-
dence suggesting that decisions taken within a household are rarely joint and more often
dominated by a specific household member (Pahl, 1995). Therefore, while it is useful to
look at equivalised income inequality to get a first idea of how unequally income is distrib-
uted within society, specific questions require looking into inequality within a household
(for example, when determining how child transfers should be allocated if mothers are
more likely to spend on children rather than fathers).
The data on income and covariates come from the yearly European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) instrument running since 2004. The data are com-
piled from a mixture of the survey and administrative sources. Each year around 5 thousand
Lithuanian households with around 10 thousand persons over 16 years old who agree to
share information on their income are included. The exact number of households and
persons recorded in Lithuania and other countries in 2015 is shown in Table 1. Most of
these persons provided all information on income, as can be seen from column 5 titled
‘Observations’. As all EU member states collect data using the same methodology, we can
compare the inequality in Lithuania with that of other EU countries.
While the data is explained by Eurostat (2018c), several features are mentioned here.
The survey captures household income and, therefore, certain income components are
available for the household rather than the individual level. Therefore, the income of all
household members is summed up and allocated to each household member. While
most covariates are recorded at the time of the interview, income is recorded for a pre-
vious year (the reference year). In this paper, all years represent reference years. While
the EU-SILC has a large survey component, some countries make use of register (admin-
istrative) data and are referred to as register countries. In 2015, the register countries
included Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland,
Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. Finally, survey weights are used to form con-
clusions on the population from the sample data. The weights are further adjusted accord-
ing to Eurostat (2018b): weights of household members over 16 years old are scaled up by
distributing weights of those under 16.
3. Is income inequality in Lithuania high?
First, we have examined inequality from the full data sample and then analysed subgroup
inequality (inequality between- and within-subgroups) in Lithuania.
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3.1. Inequality
The most popular measure of the level of inequality is the Gini coefficient. The higher the
Gini, the greater the level of inequality and it stood at G=0.37 for Lithuania in 2015 (Euro-
stat, 2020). The Gini is represented, as in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), by two times the
covariance between income y and the rank of income F(y) divided by average income μ,
G = 2Cov(y, F(y))
m
, (1)
which describes inequality within the entire population. Since we have sample data only,
we modify (1) to include sample weights, as shown in (A1) in Appendix.
Lithuania’s Gini coefficient has been compared with the Gini coefficients of all countries
that are included in the EU-SILC data set for 2015 in Figure 1 and with the Gini coefficients
for a subset of all countries in Table 2. The subset of countries includes the Baltic States,
Finland as one of the Scandinavian countries, Germany – which represents the average
inequality in the EU and Slovakia, where inequality is the lowest. As in previous studies
Table 1. EU-SILC summary statistics for 2015 income reference year.
Country Country Households
Household
members Observations Average income Median income Gini
code name (thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (thousand euro) (thousand euro) (percent)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
AT Austria 6 10.8 10.8 26.1 23.7 27.2
BE Belgium 5.9 11.1 11.1 24.3 22.3 26.3
BG Bulgaria 7.3 15.6 15.5 3.9 3.2 37.7
CH Switzerland 7.8 14.9 14.9 50.9 44.3 29.4
CY Cyprus 4.2 9.4 9.4 16.9 14 32.1
CZ Czech Republic 8.5 16.2 16.2 8.8 7.8 25.1
DE Germany 13.3 23.3 23.1 23.9 21.2 29.8
DK Denmark 6.3 11.8 11.8 32.1 28.7 27.7
EE Estonia 6 12.5 12.5 10.1 8.6 32.7
EL Greece 18.3 38 37.9 8.7 7.5 34.3
ES Spain 14.2 30.7 30.7 15.8 13.7 34.5
FI Finland 10.6 20.7 20.7 26.4 23.6 25.4
FR France 11.5 21.3 21.3 25.3 21.7 29.2
HR Croatia 7.6 17 17 6.3 5.7 29.8
HU Hungary 8 15.9 15.8 5.4 4.8 28.2
IE Ireland 5.2 10.2 10.2 25.5 22.4 29.5
IT Italy 21.3 41.5 41.5 18.3 16.2 33.1
LT Lithuania 4.8 9.6 9.6 7 5.6 37.0
LU Luxembourg 3.8 8.2 8.2 39.8 34.4 31.5
LV Latvia 6 11.6 11.6 7.5 6.4 34.5
NL Netherlands 12.7 24.1 24.1 25.4 22.7 26.9
NO Norway 6.9 13.6 13.6 43 39.6 24.9
PL Poland 12 27.1 27.1 6.7 5.9 29.8
PT Portugal 10.6 22.7 22.7 10.6 8.8 33.9
RO Romania 7.4 15.8 15.7 2.7 2.4 34.8
RS Serbia 5.6 15.1 15.1 3 2.6 38.6
SE Sweden 5.8 11.2 11.2 27.3 25.2 27.6
SI Slovenia 8.6 21.9 21.9 13.2 12.3 24.3
SK Slovakia 5.7 14.1 14.1 7.4 7 24.3
UK United Kingdom 9.7 17.8 17.6 24.6 21.1 31.5
Notes: The variables ‘Households’ and ‘Household members’ are the unique number of households and household
members in the data set. The variable ‘Observations’ refers to those household members for whom all income data is
available. Columns 6–8 refer to the average, median and the Gini coefficient of the population estimate of equivalized
household disposable income.
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(IMF, 2016; Lazutka, 2017), income inequality in Lithuania is one is of the highest according
to the EU-SILC. The estimated confidence intervals (Figure 1) and standard errors (Table 2)
indicate that this is statistically significant. For example, the Gini in Lithuania is about 7 Gini
points higher than in Germany. The latter also happens to be the median in terms of
inequality within the whole EU-SILC sample of countries.
Although Table 2 focuses on fewer countries, it provides more statistics on inequality
than Figure 1. In Figure 1, household disposable income is equivalised by the OECD-
modified equivalence scale. In Table 2, two different scales are used: the OECD-
modified scale and the square root equivalence scale. The square root scale increases
the Gini for Lithuania by 0.3 points, yet remains with the highest level of income inequality
among all countries and 7 Gini points higher than the median country.
Furthermore, in Table 2, the generalized Gini coefficient, G(v) (Yitzhaki, 1983), where
parameter v represents inequality aversion. This inequality parameter represents the dis-
satisfaction expressed towards inequality. With this parameter we can model different
Figure 1. The Gini coefficients of equivalised disposable income in all EU-SILC countries. Household
disposable income is equivalised by the OECD-modified scale. Confidence intervals are estimated by
using Rao et al. (1992) bootstrap methodology. Information on survey design is provided by
Goedemé (2013) and Zardo and Goedemé (2016).
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societal preferences. The value v=2 gives the standard Gini, v between 1 and 2 represent
lower inequality dissatisfaction and v>2 indicates higher dissatisfaction. The measurement
G(1.5) results in lower Gini values in all countries for both equivalence scales (i.e. inequality
is not as ‘bad’). Additionally, the difference between the Gini in Lithuania and the median
country shrinks to 5 Gini points for both scales. Nevertheless, inequality in Lithuania
remains significantly the highest out of the sample of six countries. Setting v=4 increases
the Gini index, but for Lithuania it remains the highest among the selected countries.
Finally, the Gini is compared with other measures of inequality. Other prominent
measures include the Atkinson index (Atk) and General entropy index (GEI), see Das and
Parikh (1982), Cowell (2000) and Plat (2012). Both of these measures show that the
higher the value, the greater the inequality. Both indexes also feature inequality aversion
parameters. In the Atkinson index, a parameter value close to zero means indifference
about inequality, while higher values show that people dislike it. In contrast, high GEI par-
ameter values mean that people are indifferent about inequality. In all cases, inequality in
Lithuania remained significantly the highest.
3.2. Subgroup inequality
The previous subsection has shown that inequality in Lithuania is large when compared to
EU countries. Next, we will consider inequality between and within population subgroups,
Table 2. Income inequality measures under different equivalence scales.
Country Equivalence scale G(2) G(1.5) G(4) GEI(0) GEI(1) GEI(2) Atk(1) Atk(0.1)
DE OECD 29.764 19.602 46.279 0.157 0.158 0.220 0.146 0.016
(0.373) (0.318) (0.388) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.001)
EE OECD 32.738 21.096 51.419 0.192 0.171 0.188 0.175 0.017
(0.358) (0.256) (0.463) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
FI OECD 25.416 16.897 40.216 0.112 0.116 0.150 0.106 0.011
(0.283) (0.236) (0.340) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.000)
LT OECD 36.957 24.644 55.797 0.254 0.233 0.306 0.224 0.023
(0.755) (0.609) (0.801) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.009) (0.001)
LV OECD 34.479 22.756 53.403 0.217 0.202 0.255 0.195 0.020
(0.511) (0.432) (0.563) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.006) (0.001)
Median OECD 29.764 19.719 46.279 0.158 0.163 0.228 0.146 0.016
(0.373) (0.538) (0.388) (0.008) (0.011) (0.039) (0.006) (0.001)
SK OECD 24.277 15.624 40.310 0.115 0.106 0.136 0.109 0.011
(0.482) (0.383) (0.682) (0.006) (0.007) (0.022) (0.005) (0.001)
DE Sqr. rt 30.224 19.873 47.169 0.163 0.162 0.223 0.150 0.016
(0.379) (0.324) (0.389) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.001)
EE Sqr. rt 33.158 21.305 52.399 0.199 0.175 0.190 0.180 0.017
(0.354) (0.253) (0.451) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
FI Sqr. rt 25.918 17.202 41.213 0.117 0.120 0.155 0.110 0.012
(0.288) (0.240) (0.347) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.000)
LT Sqr. rt 37.383 24.854 56.684 0.261 0.237 0.307 0.230 0.023
(0.763) (0.625) (0.790) (0.012) (0.011) (0.023) (0.009) (0.001)
LV Sqr. rt 35.039 23.063 54.513 0.226 0.207 0.259 0.202 0.021
(0.521) (0.447) (0.553) (0.007) (0.008) (0.021) (0.006) (0.001)
Median Sqr. rt 29.699 19.873 47.169 0.161 0.162 0.223 0.149 0.016
(0.662) (0.324) (0.389) (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.007) (0.001)
SK Sqr. rt 25.000 16.043 41.302 0.120 0.109 0.132 0.113 0.011
(0.447) (0.350) (0.622) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.005) (0.001)
Notes: Table contains inequality measures for the median country (from all EU countries) and selected countries for each
equivalence scale. G(v) represents the Gini index with values v=2,1.5,4 of parameter of inequality aversion, GEI(a) stands
for the General entrhopy index, and Atk(b) is the Atkinson index, where b=1,0.1 and a=0,1,2 represents the degree of
inequality aversion. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in the parenthesis.
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for example, between males and females and amongst males and females. Then we will
estimate stratification – the extent to which income of one group overlaps income of
other groups.
Continuing the discussion started in Section 2, the interpretation of a subgroup may not
be straightforward, as we are dealing with equivalised income instead of individual
income, but can be explained with the help of an example. Imagine a household com-
posed of one male and one female. Then, comparing household income (i.e. adding up
household members’ income and allocating the summed household income to each
member) implies no income inequality between the male and the female in that house-
hold. However, this is only true if all households have the same number of males and
females. Some households are consisting of more males, while others have a higher
number of female members. If males tend to earn more than females, households with
more males will earn higher equivalised household income than equivalised households
with more females. In aggregate, this will lead to inequalities between the subgroups.
Inequality between this group should be interpreted as ‘inequality between male and
female-dominated households’. This way, we can combine information on household
income and the composition with individual characteristics. Of course, there could be
other variables that are also correlated. For example, females tend to live longer and
are therefore more likely to be retired and hence receive lower income. However, this
approach abstracts from other variables.
The methodology used to estimate inequality between subgroups is similar to the one
used by IMF (2016) and is based on Eurostat (2018a). The methodology for estimating
inequality within subgroups and stratification are adapted from Yitzhaki and Lerman
(1991). Additionally, the technique proposed by Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) is used to
decompose total inequality into between, within and stratification terms to see which of
them contributes most to inequality.
Inequality between subgroupsInequality between subgroups refers to measured
inequality between households grouped under certain criteria. For example, house-
holds can be grouped by ‘Sex’ into two subgroups l=1 and l=2: ‘Males’ and
‘Females’. To estimate between subgroup inequality, we first estimate the weighted
average income of a subgroup m̂(l) and then divide by the average weighted income
of all subgroups m̂, see (A3) in Appendix 1, to get an income ratio m̂(l)/m̂. We then
compare the ratio with that of the EU, namely of its member states that joined the
EU before 2004 (old EU states), and with those Member States that joined it after
2004 (new EU states). Our method is similar to that used in the IMF (2016), but has
several differences: the IMF (2016) analyse weighted income decile ratios while we
compare weighted average income ratios. The IMF (2016) compares Lithuania to the
EU, while we additionally compare it to new and old EU states to control for the devel-
opment of countries. Finally, we have more grouping criteria (a total of nine) and esti-
mate standard errors.
Our findings are in line with those of IMF (2016), which also reviews between-subgroup
inequality in Lithuania. The IMF (2016) reveals large inequalities between the top and the
bottom income deciles, between the employed and the unemployed and non-labour
market participants, between the elderly and other age subgroups, as well as between
educated and less educated households subgroups, i.e. these ratios are much higher in
Lithuania than in the entire EU.
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In addition to these findings, the results presented in Table 3 allow adding the
following points:
. Differences of ratios are significant betweenmany subgroups in Lithuania. The subgroups
include those grouped according to the IMF (2016) criteria (activity status, age bracket,
number of dependants, education) as well as ratios in other subgroups. For example,
Table 3. Ratios of average subgroup incomes in 2015.
Grouping Subgroup EU EU new EU old LT
activity status employed 113.2 (0.5)
[25.5]
115.4 (0.9) [9.8] 112.6 (0.6)
[15.5]
123.2 (1.3) [5.2]
activity status unemployed 61.0 (1.3) [3.3] 59.5 (1.9) [1.2] 61.3 (1.6) [2.0] 54.0 (3.6) [0.6]
activity status retired 97.3 (1.0) [9.5] 95.2 (1.3) [4.2] 97.9 (1.2) [5.6] 71.1 (1.7) [2.0]
activity status study 85.5 (1.6) [3.5] 88.4 (2.4) [1.3] 84.8 (1.8) [2.2] 86.8 (3.2) [0.7]
activity status other 77.4 (1.3) [5.7] 70.5 (1.9) [2.2] 79.2 (1.6) [3.5] 68.9 (3.1) [1.0]
nr working 0 78.3 (0.9) [12.8] 75.1 (1.2) [4.6] 79.0 (1.0) [8.0] 53.3 (1.6) [2.4]
nr working 1 93.4 (0.9) [15.1] 93.6 (1.6) [5.8] 93.3 (1.0) [9.2] 94.1 (2.6) [3.1]
nr working 2 119.3 (0.9)
[16.7]
117.8 (1.4) [6.7] 119.7 (1.0)
[10.1]
131.4 (2.8) [3.3]
nr working 3 116.9 (2.3) [2.5] 115.6 (4.1) [1.5] 117.5 (2.7) [1.3] 130.5 (4.8) [0.6]
nr working 4 124.3 (4.2) [0.6] 124.0 (5.3) [0.4] 124.5 (6.0) [0.3] 124.9 (8.6) [0.2]







main income self-employment 106.3 (3.2) [3.4] 84.3 (3.2) [1.7] 114.8 (4.2) [1.9] 174.9 (10.7)
[0.7]
main income other 88.7 (0.6) [20.4] 79.3 (1.6) [5.6] 90.4 (0.7) [13.4] 57.6 (1.6) [2.8]
occupation basic level 74.6 (1.3) [4.5] 78.1 (4.1) [1.9] 73.7 (1.2) [2.7] 69.6 (2.5) [1.4]
occupation mid-level 90.0 (0.6) [21.0] 91.9 (0.8) [9.6] 89.3 (0.7) [12.2] 88.7 (1.7) [4.1]
occupation technicians, associates 112.9 (1.3) [6.0] 118.7 (2.1) [1.6] 111.9 (1.4) [3.9] 117.8 (4.6) [0.6]
occupation professionals 139.1 (1.8) [7.3] 145.8 (2.6) [2.4] 137.7 (2.1) [4.6] 129.1 (3.1) [1.9]
occupation managers 137.9 (3.3) [2.3] 153.0 (5.5) [0.8] 134.7 (3.8) [1.5] 162.7 (11.6)
[0.6]
sector agriculture 74.2 (2.6) [1.0] 66.4 (2.5) [1.0] 83.4 (4.7) [0.3] 99.5 (6.7) [0.3]
sector industry 115.6 (1.9) [3.4] 116.2 (2.3) [2.0] 115.3 (2.5) [1.8] 113.9 (3.8) [0.8]
sector IT, finance, RE, admin 134.4 (2.7) [3.4] 158.2 (7.9) [0.9] 130.6 (2.8) [2.2] 157.2 (10.9)
[0.6]
sector public admin, education,
health
118.0 (1.3) [5.8] 127.1 (2.3) [1.7] 116.4 (1.5) [3.7] 124.6 (3.2) [1.1]
sector other services 100.2 (1.1) [7.6] 109.5 (1.8) [3.0] 97.8 (1.3) [4.6] 119.3 (2.8) [1.8]
age bracket under 19 83.8 (2.0) [1.8] 82.4 (3.5) [0.7] 84.2 (2.3) [1.1] 83.6 (4.1) [0.4]
age bracket 19–29 91.3 (1.3) [6.9] 95.5 (1.9) [3.0] 90.0 (1.5) [4.1] 104.2 (3.8) [1.7]







age bracket 65+ 96.9 (1.1) [9.1] 93.5 (1.4) [3.3] 97.7 (1.3) [5.6] 76.2 (1.9) [1.9]
dependents 0 105.2 (0.6)
[24.5]
105.4 (1.1) [8.9] 105.2 (0.7)
[15.1]
101.0 (1.8) [4.8]
dependents 1 102.6 (1.3) [9.2] 107.0 (1.9) [4.3] 101.1 (1.6) [5.3] 106.7 (3.2) [2.1]
dependents 2 94.2 (1.1) [9.7] 93.2 (1.8) [3.9] 94.5 (1.3) [5.8] 102.4 (4.8) [2.0]
dependents 3 82.7 (2.1) [3.2] 80.7 (3.7) [1.2] 83.2 (2.5) [2.0] 73.9 (6.9) [0.5]
dependents 4 73.0 (4.5) [0.8] 60.9 (6.2) [0.3] 75.9 (5.3) [0.5] 55.6 (5.5) [0.1]
dependents 5 50.9 (4.5) [0.4] 40.0 (3.5) [0.3] 58.7 (6.1) [0.2] 47.1 (11.8) [0.1]
education up to secondary 87.8 (0.4) [32.4] 87.9 (0.6) [14.1] 87.8 (0.5) [19.0] 78.2 (1.5) [4.6]
education post-secondary 103.0 (2.5) [1.5] 107.3 (3.9) [0.6] 101.7 (3.1) [0.9] 92.7 (2.3) [1.9]
education tertiary education 129.6 (1.0)
[13.4]
142.1 (2.0) [3.9] 127.3 (1.2) [8.6] 138.1 (2.8) [3.0]
sex male 102.2 (0.5)
[22.7]
102.8 (0.9) [9.0] 102.1 (0.7)
[13.7]
104.5 (0.8) [4.3]
sex female 98.0 (0.5) [25.2] 97.4 (0.8) [10.0] 98.1 (0.6) [15.2] 96.4 (0.6) [5.3]
Notes: Ratios are defined as weighted average income of a subgroup divided by weighted average income of all subgroups
within that grouping. Bootstrapped standard errors are in the parenthesis. Number of observations in thousands in
brackets.
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we split households based on the main income source. Those who receive largely self-
employment income tend, on average, to have more disposable income than those
who work as employees or others – a trend not observed in the EU as a whole. Significant
inequality also exists between subgroups grouped by the number of people working in
the household (nr working) and the sector where one works (sector).
. Ratios between the majority of the nine subgroups are also significantly different from
the ratios between their EU counterparts. Besides the subgroups in the IMF (2016)
(those grouped by activity status, age bracket, education), the self-employed in Lithua-
nia on average earn proportionally more than their EU counterparts. Additionally, those
who work in the information technologies, finance, real estate, and administration
sector (IT, finance, RE, admin) earn, on average, relatively more income in Lithuania
than one would in the EU.
. There are some groups between which inequality in Lithuania is smaller as compared to
the EU. For example, those working within the agricultural sector are relatively better off
in Lithuania compared to the EU. Additionally, income ratios in Lithuania are more
similar to those in the new EU states. In particular, those who are under 19 years old
have very similar relative incomes both in Lithuania and in the new EU states.
In general, ratios between subgroups are largely persistent and slightly widening since
2010. This can be seen in Table 4 which shows the ratio dynamics in Lithuania. For example,
there was a slowly widening gap between the employed and the retired. This could be
explainedby risingmarket incomesdue to a recoveringeconomythatbenefited theemployed
while statutory pensions, the main source of income for the retired, did not increase in the
period due to budget consolidation (Černiauskas et al., 2020). Once the recovery began,
wages in the private sector started rising, especially IT, finance, RE, admin sector, while the gov-
ernment started raising public sector wages (Public admin, education, health) much later. This
could also explain the rising ratio difference between the two sectors.
Inequality within subgroupsInequality exists within subgroups in Lithuania. A common
way to measure it is to calculate inequality measures for subgroup income as is done
for total income (see Ĝl in Formula (A4) in Appendix 1). We have calculated the Gini coeffi-
cients for Lithuania’s subgroups and compared them with the Gini coefficients of the EU,
new and old EU states in Table 5.
. Most of the within-subgroup Gini coefficients examined in Table 5 are higher in Lithua-
nia than in the EU. Especially large subgroup inequality exists among those working in
the agricultural sector and the unemployed.
. The above-mentioned within-group inequalities are much higher in Lithuania than in
the EU. Additionally, households, where the main source of income is self-employment
income, are also unequal among themselves, even though similar inequality within sub-
groups exists in new EU states. The Gini of households with many children is relatively
small and we know from the between analysis that these households earn a much lower
income.
Over time, inequality within subgroups increased in many subgroups. Table 6 shows
that the rise has been especially strong since 2010. In particular, the Gini coefficient of
the unemployed rose from 39.8 in 2004 to 47.8 in 2015. This may be in part due to
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unequal economic recovery, where some of the unemployed were able to find some
income sources, while others did not. Unemployment has risen substantially since the
crisis and there have been many unemployment transfers handed out. However, these
transfers were stopped to those who were unemployed for a longer time. Additionally,
as the economy recovered, it became easier for the unemployed to be in employment
for at least several months during the year. Similarly, there was a rise in inequality
among those who are neither employed, unemployed, retired, or students (largely dis-
abled). Additionally, there has been a rise in inequality among those who are over 65
and, to a lesser extent, those aged 30–64. Inequality increased within all the different edu-
cation levels and within all occupations (managers in particular). Inequality increased in
the agricultural sector as well as in the IT, finance, real estate and administration sectors
(IT, finance, RE, admin).
Stratification between subgroupsInequality is linked to stratification. Stratification
measures whether the income of each member of a subgroup differs compared to
Table 4. Ratios of average subgroup incomes in Lithunia.
Grouping Subgroup 2006 2010 2015
activity status employed 120.2 (0.9) [6.2] 122.1 (1.1) [5.4] 123.2 (1.3) [5.2]
activity status unemployed 51.1 (2.7) [0.4] 57.7 (2.3) [1.1] 54.0 (3.6) [0.6]
activity status retired 70.4 (1.2) [2.0] 86.4 (1.3) [2.3] 71.1 (1.7) [2.0]
activity status study 89.1 (2.2) [1.1] 86.2 (2.3) [1.1] 86.8 (3.2) [0.7]
activity status other 70.7 (2.2) [1.1] 74.3 (1.9) [1.0] 68.9 (3.1) [1.0]
nr working 0 51.4 (1.2) [2.1] 66.2 (1.3) [3.1] 53.3 (1.6) [2.4]
nr working 1 86.5 (1.8) [3.0] 89.7 (1.8) [3.4] 94.1 (2.6) [3.1]
nr working 2 122.0 (1.6) [4.7] 128.9 (2.1) [3.6] 131.4 (2.8) [3.3]
nr working 3 137.5 (5.6) [0.8] 144.7 (6.8) [0.7] 130.5 (4.8) [0.6]
nr working 4 138.7 (11.2) [0.2] 122.2 (11.5) [0.2] 124.9 (8.6) [0.2]
main income employment 114.9 (0.9) [7.5] 115.3 (1.1) [6.7] 111.5 (1.4) [6.1]
main income self-employment 106.1 (5.6) [0.6] 127.1 (10.8) [0.4] 174.9 (10.7) [0.7]
main income other 59.0 (1.4) [2.8] 71.0 (1.2) [3.9] 57.6 (1.6) [2.8]
occupation basic level 72.1 (1.8) [1.6] 72.6 (1.7) [1.5] 69.6 (2.5) [1.4]
occupation mid-level 90.0 (1.1) [5.1] 87.6 (1.1) [4.8] 88.7 (1.7) [4.1]
occupation technicians, associates 120.0 (4.3) [0.7] 119.3 (3.8) [0.7] 117.8 (4.6) [0.6]
occupation professionals 146.4 (3.4) [1.5] 138.9 (2.8) [1.9] 129.1 (3.1) [1.9]
occupation managers 149.9 (4.6) [0.7] 146.0 (4.6) [0.7] 162.7 (11.6) [0.6]
sector agriculture 85.1 (5.2) [0.5] 90.9 (5.9) [0.4] 99.5 (6.7) [0.3]
sector industry 109.9 (2.6) [1.1] 113.8 (3.9) [0.9] 113.9 (3.8) [0.8]
sector IT, finance, RE, admin 168.2 (8.0) [0.2] 137.2 (4.9) [0.5] 157.2 (10.9) [0.6]
sector public admin, education, health 131.2 (2.7) [1.4] 138.1 (3.1) [1.3] 124.6 (3.2) [1.1]
sector other services 117.0 (1.9) [2.2] 111.6 (2.2) [1.8] 119.3 (2.8) [1.8]
age bracket under 19 82.0 (2.6) [0.6] 80.3 (2.8) [0.6] 83.6 (4.1) [0.4]
age bracket 19–29 111.2 (2.9) [2.2] 101.7 (2.6) [2.0] 104.2 (3.8) [1.7]
age bracket 30–64 105.1 (0.9) [6.4] 104.3 (0.8) [6.4] 107.7 (1.2) [5.7]
age bracket 65+ 73.6 (1.4) [1.8] 90.4 (1.6) [2.0] 76.2 (1.9) [1.9]
dependents 0 104.0 (1.4) [5.3] 102.7 (1.4) [4.9] 101.0 (1.8) [4.8]
dependents 1 106.0 (2.3) [2.9] 102.9 (2.2) [2.8] 106.7 (3.2) [2.1]
dependents 2 95.0 (2.8) [2.0] 99.0 (3.3) [2.3] 102.4 (4.8) [2.0]
dependents 3 72.5 (4.6) [0.5] 81.8 (6.5) [0.7] 73.9 (6.9) [0.5]
dependents 4 45.7 (10.5) [0.1] 66.8 (10.1) [0.2] 55.6 (5.5) [0.1]
dependents 5 35.9 (6.4) [0.1] 95.5 (16.1) [0.1] 47.1 (11.8) [0.1]
education up to secondary 81.5 (0.9) [5.8] 81.7 (1.0) [6.0] 78.2 (1.5) [4.6]
education post-secondary 95.9 (1.6) [2.4] 96.1 (2.0) [2.1] 92.7 (2.3) [1.9]
education tertiary education 148.5 (2.4) [2.5] 140.6 (2.2) [2.9] 138.1 (2.8) [3.0]
sex male 104.9 (0.6) [4.9] 102.9 (0.7) [4.9] 104.5 (0.8) [4.3]
sex female 96.0 (0.5) [6.0] 97.6 (0.5) [6.1] 96.4 (0.6) [5.3]
Notes: Ratios are defined as weighted average income of a subgroup divided by weighted average income of all subgroups
within that grouping. Bootstrapped standard errors are in the parenthesis. Number of observations in thousands in
brackets.
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the income of every member of all other subgroups. We use the methodology pro-
posed by Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991), which measures stratification on a scale from
−100 to 100. Value 100 indicates high stratification: all members of a subgroup
have income that is different from members of other subgroups. Value 0 indicates
no stratification – there is a perfect income overlap between the subgroups. Negative
numbers indicate that the subgroup should actually be multiple subgroups, i.e.
income of some subgroup members is much higher than that of members of other
subgroups, however, some members also have much lower income than members
of other subgroups. The estimates of measures of stratification in Table 7 allow us
to make two more insights:
. Several subgroups in Lithuania are stratified. Families with more dependants are
detached in terms of income from other subgroups and the difference is stark when
compared to the EU. Households who are employed or have more employed
Table 5. The Gini coefficient of income of subgroups in 2015.
Grouping Subgroup EU new EU states old EU states LT
activity status employed 28.6 (0.4) [25.5] 29.7 (0.7) [9.8] 28.3 (0.4) [15.5] 33.0 (0.9) [5.2]
activity status unemployed 35.1 (0.9) [3.3] 36.9 (1.3) [1.2] 34.6 (1.1) [2.0] 47.8 (2.2) [0.6]
activity status retired 27.4 (0.5) [9.5] 25.9 (0.5) [4.2] 27.8 (0.7) [5.6] 29.6 (1.0) [2.0]
activity status student 32.2 (0.8) [3.5] 30.1 (1.0) [1.3] 32.7 (0.9) [2.2] 35.1 (1.6) [0.7]
activity status other 32.5 (0.8) [5.7] 31.3 (1.1) [2.2] 32.7 (1.0) [3.5] 38.0 (1.5) [1.0]
nr working 0 32.2 (0.6) [12.8] 31.1 (0.9) [4.6] 32.4 (0.6) [8.0] 31.5 (1.5) [2.4]
nr working 1 31.6 (0.6) [15.1] 32.2 (1.2) [5.8] 31.4 (0.6) [9.2] 36.4 (1.1) [3.1]
nr working 2 26.5 (0.4) [16.7] 27.2 (0.6) [6.7] 26.3 (0.5) [10.1] 31.6 (1.3) [3.3]
nr working 3 25.1 (0.9) [2.5] 27.6 (1.7) [1.5] 23.8 (1.0) [1.3] 21.0 (1.4) [0.6]
nr working 4 24.6 (1.3) [0.6] 25.2 (1.9) [0.4] 24.2 (1.8) [0.3] 17.7 (3.3) [0.2]
main income employment 27.2 (0.3) [24.1] 27.0 (0.4) [11.7] 27.3 (0.4) [13.6] 31.3 (0.9) [6.1]
main income self-employment 42.6 (1.3) [3.4] 39.1 (1.6) [1.7] 43.0 (1.5) [1.9] 39.7 (2.2) [0.7]
main income other 31.9 (0.4) [20.4] 33.9 (1.3) [5.6] 31.5 (0.5) [13.4] 33.0 (1.3) [2.8]
occupation basic level 28.7 (1.0) [4.5] 33.1 (3.5) [1.9] 27.4 (0.7) [2.7] 35.6 (1.4) [1.4]
occupation mid-level 27.5 (0.3) [21.0] 27.5 (0.5) [9.6] 27.5 (0.4) [12.2] 34.8 (0.9) [4.1]
occupation technicians, associates 25.2 (0.6) [6.0] 24.4 (0.7) [1.6] 25.3 (0.7) [3.9] 31.0 (1.5) [0.6]
occupation professionals 29.2 (0.8) [7.3] 25.9 (0.8) [2.4] 29.8 (0.9) [4.6] 31.0 (0.9) [1.9]
occupation managers 31.9 (1.1) [2.3] 30.9 (1.7) [0.8] 31.9 (1.3) [1.5] 39.6 (2.5) [0.6]
sector agriculture 35.2 (1.7) [1.0] 35.2 (1.5) [1.0] 34.0 (2.9) [0.3] 44.5 (2.4) [0.3]
sector industry 27.1 (0.9) [3.4] 26.4 (0.8) [2.0] 27.4 (1.2) [1.8] 30.3 (1.4) [0.8]
sector IT, finance, RE, admin 30.8 (1.0) [3.4] 31.5 (3.2) [0.9] 30.5 (1.0) [2.2] 35.1 (2.9) [0.6]
sector public admin, education, health 25.7 (0.5) [5.8] 25.0 (0.8) [1.7] 25.7 (0.6) [3.7] 28.7 (1.0) [1.1]
sector other services 27.9 (0.6) [7.6] 27.0 (0.8) [3.0] 27.9 (0.7) [4.6] 32.7 (1.2) [1.8]
age bracket under 19 31.1 (1.1) [1.8] 32.8 (1.5) [0.7] 30.6 (1.3) [1.1] 34.8 (1.9) [0.4]
age bracket 19–29 30.8 (0.7) [6.9] 31.0 (1.0) [3.0] 30.6 (0.9) [4.1] 35.8 (1.4) [1.7]
age bracket 30–64 31.1 (0.3) [30.1] 31.7 (0.6) [12.0] 31.0 (0.4) [18.1] 37.4 (0.9) [5.7]
age bracket 65+ 28.4 (0.7) [9.1] 26.7 (0.5) [3.3] 28.8 (0.8) [5.6] 30.8 (1.1) [1.9]
dependents 0 31.1 (0.4) [24.5] 30.8 (0.7) [8.9] 31.1 (0.4) [15.1] 38.4 (0.8) [4.8]
dependents 1 29.9 (0.6) [9.2] 29.2 (0.8) [4.3] 30.1 (0.8) [5.3] 30.8 (1.3) [2.1]
dependents 2 28.4 (0.6) [9.7] 29.2 (1.0) [3.9] 28.1 (0.7) [5.8] 37.9 (2.3) [2.0]
dependents 3 32.2 (1.1) [3.2] 32.2 (2.1) [1.2] 32.2 (1.3) [2.0] 36.2 (3.0) [0.5]
dependents 4 30.5 (2.6) [0.8] 34.6 (3.0) [0.3] 29.1 (3.0) [0.5] 20.7 (3.9) [0.1]
dependents 5 25.8 (4.0) [0.4] 21.9 (3.9) [0.3] 23.7 (5.7) [0.2] 24.7 (9.9) [0.1]
education up to secondary 29.0 (0.3) [32.4] 29.7 (0.6) [14.1] 28.8 (0.4) [19.0] 35.0 (0.8) [4.6]
education post-secondary 27.8 (1.0) [1.5] 28.2 (1.3) [0.6] 27.6 (1.2) [0.9] 34.7 (1.2) [1.9]
education tertiary education 29.6 (0.5) [13.4] 27.1 (0.6) [3.9] 30.0 (0.6) [8.6] 33.1 (1.2) [3.0]
sex male 31.0 (0.4) [22.7] 31.1 (0.6) [9.0] 30.9 (0.4) [13.7] 37.0 (0.9) [4.3]
sex female 30.6 (0.4) [25.2] 30.9 (0.7) [10.0] 30.5 (0.5) [15.2] 36.8 (0.8) [5.3]
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in the parenthesis. Number of observations are shown in thousands in
brackets.
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members are stratified from the unemployed and those who do not participate in the
labour market. Income stratification of these subgroups is greater in Lithuania than in
the EU. Additionally, several subgroups are stratified in Lithuania to a similar extent as
they are stratified in new EU states: subgroups characterized by occupation, education,
and age bracket. This could signal that Lithuania, like in new EU states, is facing more
labour market imbalances, where the demand for highly educated professionals is
especially high, while redistribution channels are too weak to compensate for the
income of those out of labour force (e.g. elderly).
. There are several subgroups that should form several smaller subgroups in Lithuania.
The unemployed, for example, have a stratification value of −9.9, meaning that
some unemployed are relatively well off, while others are not. This could reflect that
some of the unemployed are still getting unemployment transfers, can take on part-
time work, or are simply living in a high-income household, while others do not.
Similar tendencies also exist in the agricultural sector, with some being much better
off than others.
Table 6. Gini of subgroup incomes in Lithuania.
Grouping Subgroup 2006 2010 2015
activity status employed 30.9 (0.6) [6.2] 30.6 (0.7) [5.4] 33.0 (0.9) [5.2]
activity status unemployed 42.1 (2.0) [0.4] 39.8 (1.8) [1.1] 47.8 (2.2) [0.6]
activity status retired 25.1 (0.6) [2.0] 24.2 (0.7) [2.3] 29.6 (1.0) [2.0]
activity status study 32.9 (1.3) [1.1] 34.0 (1.0) [1.1] 35.1 (1.6) [0.7]
activity status other 34.8 (1.2) [1.1] 29.7 (1.2) [1.0] 38.0 (1.5) [1.0]
nr working 0 26.7 (1.2) [2.1] 29.8 (1.0) [3.1] 31.5 (1.5) [2.4]
nr working 1 31.9 (0.8) [3.0] 32.5 (1.0) [3.4] 36.4 (1.1) [3.1]
nr working 2 29.5 (0.8) [4.7] 27.8 (0.8) [3.6] 31.6 (1.3) [3.3]
nr working 3 24.7 (1.6) [0.8] 25.4 (1.9) [0.7] 21.0 (1.4) [0.6]
nr working 4 24.5 (3.8) [0.2] 19.4 (3.3) [0.2] 17.7 (3.3) [0.2]
main income employment 30.4 (0.6) [7.5] 30.0 (0.6) [6.7] 31.3 (0.9) [6.1]
main income self-employment 37.2 (2.1) [0.6] 44.3 (2.3) [0.4] 39.7 (2.2) [0.7]
main income other 29.1 (1.2) [2.8] 29.3 (1.0) [3.9] 33.0 (1.3) [2.8]
occupation basic level 31.0 (1.2) [1.6] 29.8 (0.9) [1.5] 35.6 (1.4) [1.4]
occupation mid-level 29.9 (0.6) [5.1] 30.2 (0.7) [4.8] 34.8 (0.9) [4.1]
occupation technicians, associates 30.5 (1.8) [0.7] 28.3 (1.4) [0.7] 31.0 (1.5) [0.6]
occupation professionals 31.7 (0.9) [1.5] 28.8 (0.9) [1.9] 31.0 (0.9) [1.9]
occupation managers 31.9 (1.3) [0.7] 32.1 (1.5) [0.7] 39.6 (2.5) [0.6]
sector agriculture 41.3 (2.0) [0.5] 37.2 (2.4) [0.4] 44.5 (2.4) [0.3]
sector industry 28.3 (1.1) [1.1] 31.1 (1.6) [0.9] 30.3 (1.4) [0.8]
sector IT, finance, RE, admin 29.8 (1.8) [0.2] 28.3 (1.8) [0.5] 35.1 (2.9) [0.6]
sector public admin, education, health 29.4 (1.0) [1.4] 27.5 (0.9) [1.3] 28.7 (1.0) [1.1]
sector other services 30.4 (1.0) [2.2] 31.5 (0.9) [1.8] 32.7 (1.2) [1.8]
age bracket under 19 33.5 (1.5) [0.6] 33.1 (1.5) [0.6] 34.8 (1.9) [0.4]
age bracket 19–29 34.3 (1.3) [2.2] 32.4 (1.0) [2.0] 35.8 (1.4) [1.7]
age bracket 30–64 33.2 (0.6) [6.4] 34.7 (0.7) [6.4] 37.4 (0.9) [5.7]
age bracket 65+ 27.5 (0.9) [1.8] 24.7 (0.9) [2.0] 30.8 (1.1) [1.9]
dependents 0 35.6 (0.7) [5.3] 33.2 (0.7) [4.9] 38.4 (0.8) [4.8]
dependents 1 30.7 (0.9) [2.9] 31.2 (1.0) [2.8] 30.8 (1.3) [2.1]
dependents 2 29.1 (1.4) [2.0] 33.5 (1.4) [2.3] 37.9 (2.3) [2.0]
dependents 3 31.0 (3.1) [0.5] 36.2 (2.5) [0.7] 36.2 (3.0) [0.5]
dependents 4 35.2 (9.1) [0.1] 29.2 (5.7) [0.2] 20.7 (3.9) [0.1]
dependents 5 32.1 (7.3) [0.1] 8.5 (8.3) [0.1] 24.7 (9.9) [0.1]
education up to secondary 31.1 (0.7) [5.8] 30.6 (0.6) [6.0] 35.0 (0.8) [4.6]
education post-secondary 29.6 (0.7) [2.4] 31.5 (1.0) [2.1] 34.7 (1.2) [1.9]
education tertiary education 30.7 (0.8) [2.5] 29.5 (0.9) [2.9] 33.1 (1.2) [3.0]
sex male 33.3 (0.6) [4.9] 33.3 (0.7) [4.9] 37.0 (0.9) [4.3]
sex female 34.0 (0.6) [6.0] 32.7 (0.6) [6.1] 36.8 (0.8) [5.3]
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in the brackets. Number of observations in thousands in brackets.
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Stratification between groups has been increasing, especially since 2010 (see Table 8).
This is particularly apparent when considering activity status: the stratification coefficient
of those employed rose from 17.8% in 2010 to 32.6% in 2015. However, this could be
largely attributed to a market correction, as the stratification coefficient was around
28.7% before the crisis.
Subgroup decompositionWe have analysed between- and within-subgroup inequality
and stratification separately. Now, we will identify howmuch each of the terms contributes
to the Gini of disposable income in Lithuania and compare this to the EU, new and old EU
Table 7. Stratfication of subgroup income in 2015.
Grouping Subgroup EU new EU states old EU states LT
activity status employed 17.7 (0.8) [25.5] 14.2 (1.5) [9.8] 18.6 (1.0) [15.5] 32.6 (2.0) [5.2]
activity status unemployed 6.3 (2.3) [3.3] 7.3 (3.1) [1.2] 5.9 (2.8) [2.0] −10.0 (5.8)
[0.6]
activity status retired 6.6 (0.8) [9.5] 10.4 (1.2) [4.2] 5.7 (1.0) [5.6] 11.7 (3.0) [2.0]
activity status student −3.5 (1.2) [3.5] 0.8 (2.0) [1.3] −4.6 (1.5) [2.2] 1.3 (2.3) [0.7]
activity status other −1.6 (1.7) [5.7] 7.6 (2.2) [2.2] −3.4 (1.9) [3.5] −3.8 (3.3) [1.0]
nr working 0 −1.0 (1.3)
[12.8]
6.1 (1.7) [4.6] −2.7 (1.5) [8.0] 25.3 (6.6) [2.4]
nr working 1 −2.1 (0.8)
[15.1]
−1.5 (1.5) [5.8] −2.3 (0.9) [9.2] −0.4 (2.2) [3.1]
nr working 2 23.2 (0.9) [16.7] 17.4 (1.7) [6.7] 24.9 (1.1) [10.1] 34.8 (2.6) [3.3]
nr working 3 15.8 (2.7) [2.5] 8.4 (5.6) [1.5] 19.8 (2.5) [1.3] 42.8 (3.7) [0.6]
nr working 4 18.0 (3.4) [0.6] 15.6 (5.2) [0.4] 19.5 (4.6) [0.3] 46.2 (9.1) [0.2]
main income employment 16.3 (0.8) [24.1] 25.5 (1.6) [11.7] 14.4 (0.9) [13.6] 33.7 (2.4) [6.1]







main income other −4.5 (0.8)
[20.4]
−1.4 (2.2) [5.6] −4.8 (0.9)
[13.4]
18.4 (4.7) [2.8]
occupation basic level 6.9 (2.3) [4.5] 1.1 (6.0) [1.9] 8.9 (1.9) [2.7] 2.0 (3.4) [1.4]
occupation mid-level 7.0 (0.9) [21.0] 10.1 (1.4) [9.6] 6.4 (1.0) [12.2] 2.5 (1.8) [4.1]
occupation technicians, associates 13.5 (1.1) [6.0] 14.9 (1.7) [1.6] 13.4 (1.2) [3.9] 13.9 (2.8) [0.6]
occupation professionals 20.0 (1.6) [7.3] 27.0 (2.1) [2.4] 18.9 (1.9) [4.6] 22.3 (2.2) [1.9]
occupation managers 10.4 (2.6) [2.3] 15.9 (4.2) [0.8] 9.4 (3.0) [1.5] 17.2 (4.3) [0.6]
sector agriculture −0.6 (3.8) [1.0] 9.9 (3.9) [1.0] −5.1 (5.3) [0.3] −19.7 (3.7)
[0.3]
sector industry 4.6 (1.2) [3.4] 7.6 (1.7) [2.0] 3.4 (1.6) [1.8] 3.7 (2.5) [0.8]
sector IT, finance, RE, admin 5.5 (1.7) [3.4] 16.4 (3.7) [0.9] 4.1 (1.8) [2.2] 6.8 (3.9) [0.6]
sector public admin, education,
health
8.8 (1.2) [5.8] 12.6 (2.0) [1.7] 8.2 (1.4) [3.7] 9.8 (2.4) [1.1]
sector other services 0.6 (1.1) [7.6] 5.8 (1.7) [3.0] −0.2 (1.4) [4.6] 0.2 (2.1) [1.8]
age bracket under 19 −1.0 (1.8) [1.8] −3.6 (3.1) [0.7] −0.3 (2.2) [1.1] 1.0 (3.0) [0.4]
age bracket 19–29 −1.4 (0.9) [6.9] −1.1 (1.5) [3.0] −1.4 (1.2) [4.1] −0.6 (2.6) [1.7]
age bracket 30–64 0.0 (0.7) [30.1] −1.2 (1.2)
[12.0]
0.4 (0.8) [18.1] 2.7 (1.6) [5.7]
age bracket 65+ 4.8 (0.9) [9.1] 7.9 (1.3) [3.3] 4.1 (1.0) [5.6] 7.9 (2.6) [1.9]
dependents 0 2.3 (0.7) [24.5] 4.3 (1.2) [8.9] 1.7 (0.9) [15.1] −4.5 (2.0) [4.8]
dependents 1 1.7 (1.0) [9.2] 3.5 (1.5) [4.3] 1.3 (1.2) [5.3] 12.5 (2.9) [2.1]
dependents 2 3.8 (1.0) [9.7] 3.1 (1.8) [3.9] 4.0 (1.1) [5.8] 1.2 (2.8) [2.0]
dependents 3 −3.1 (2.0) [3.2] −1.1 (4.2) [1.2] −3.6 (2.2) [2.0] −2.5 (7.0) [0.5]
dependents 4 1.3 (6.5) [0.8] 3.3 (7.3) [0.3] 0.7 (7.4) [0.5] 43.4 (7.1) [0.1]
dependents 5 26.1 (19.4) [0.4] 48.6 (9.1) [0.3] 16.9 (25.3) [0.2] 12.0 (37.0) [0.1]
education up to secondary 7.4 (1.0) [32.4] 12.3 (2.0) [14.1] 6.5 (1.1) [19.0] 2.7 (2.1) [4.6]
education post-secondary 2.9 (2.0) [1.5] 3.0 (2.6) [0.6] 3.1 (2.4) [0.9] 3.6 (1.9) [1.9]
education tertiary education 17.2 (1.3) [13.4] 26.3 (1.9) [3.9] 15.8 (1.4) [8.6] 27.7 (2.4) [3.0]
sex male 1.0 (0.6) [22.7] 0.6 (1.0) [9.0] 1.1 (0.7) [13.7] 2.4 (1.1) [4.3]







Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in the parenthesis. Number of observations are shown in thousands in
brackets.
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states. To do this, we will use the methodology provided by Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991),
outlined in Appendix 1.
The subgroup decomposition results are presented in Table 9. The Gini coefficient is
decomposed into within, between, and stratification component for each of the nine
groupings considered before. The following conclusions can be drawn:
. The majority of inequality decomposes into within-groups rather than between-groups
in Lithuania. The largest between-contribution is observed between different house-
holds which have a different number of people working (nr working, 10 Gini points),
but even here the within-contribution is 3 times higher. This finding is not surprising,
as inequality within subgroups is often found to matter more (see Elbers et al., 2008),
suggesting that the majority of variation in income is between households of similar
observable characteristics. Income inequality within groups is also more important
for the EU. Additionally, several household characteristics seem to not contribute to
inequality significantly in Lithuania, for example, sex.
Table 8. Stratfication of subgroup incomes in Lithuania.
Grouping Subgroup 2006 2010 2015
activity status employed 28.7 (1.6) [6.2] 17.8 (1.9) [5.4] 32.6 (2.0) [5.2]
activity status unemployed 6.5 (4.7) [0.4] 4.0 (4.3) [1.1] −10.0 (5.8) [0.6]
activity status retired 15.6 (2.2) [2.0] 21.0 (1.9) [2.3] 11.7 (3.0) [2.0]
activity status study 0.2 (1.8) [1.1] −4.5 (1.9) [1.1] 1.3 (2.3) [0.7]
activity status other 0.5 (2.4) [1.1] 9.1 (2.2) [1.0] −3.8 (3.3) [1.0]
nr working 0 44.3 (3.8) [2.1] 22.7 (2.5) [3.1] 25.3 (6.6) [2.4]
nr working 1 0.9 (1.8) [3.0] −0.4 (2.1) [3.4] −0.4 (2.2) [3.1]
nr working 2 31.3 (2.1) [4.7] 26.3 (2.6) [3.6] 34.8 (2.6) [3.3]
nr working 3 34.0 (5.7) [0.8] 33.1 (5.5) [0.7] 42.8 (3.7) [0.6]
nr working 4 27.4 (13.8) [0.2] 36.6 (10.4) [0.2] 46.2 (9.1) [0.2]
main income employment 35.0 (2.4) [7.5] 17.1 (2.4) [6.7] 33.7 (2.4) [6.1]
main income self-employment −3.3 (3.0) [0.6] −16.9 (5.2) [0.4] 14.8 (8.2) [0.7]
main income other 23.3 (4.3) [2.8] 20.9 (2.5) [3.9] 18.4 (4.7) [2.8]
occupation basic level 5.2 (3.1) [1.6] 11.4 (2.1) [1.5] 2.0 (3.4) [1.4]
occupation mid-level 9.0 (1.4) [5.1] 8.3 (1.7) [4.8] 2.5 (1.8) [4.1]
occupation technicians, associates 13.9 (2.8) [0.7] 11.1 (3.7) [0.7] 13.9 (2.8) [0.6]
occupation professionals 22.1 (2.7) [1.5] 22.0 (2.6) [1.9] 22.3 (2.2) [1.9]
occupation managers 19.8 (3.4) [0.7] 14.7 (3.4) [0.7] 17.2 (4.3) [0.6]
sector agriculture −15.7 (4.3) [0.5] −10.7 (5.1) [0.4] −19.7 (3.7) [0.3]
sector industry 5.3 (2.1) [1.1] 0.9 (2.7) [0.9] 3.7 (2.5) [0.8]
sector IT, finance, RE, admin 17.0 (6.5) [0.2] 8.6 (4.4) [0.5] 6.8 (3.9) [0.6]
sector public admin, education, health 10.2 (2.2) [1.4] 13.0 (2.5) [1.3] 9.8 (2.4) [1.1]
sector other services 3.1 (1.9) [2.2] −0.8 (1.9) [1.8] 0.2 (2.1) [1.8]
age bracket under 19 −0.3 (2.1) [0.6] 0.3 (2.8) [0.6] 1.0 (3.0) [0.4]
age bracket 19–29 1.9 (2.2) [2.2] −2.5 (2.1) [2.0] −0.6 (2.6) [1.7]
age bracket 30–64 5.3 (1.3) [6.4] −6.8 (1.3) [6.4] 2.7 (1.6) [5.7]
age bracket 65+ 7.9 (2.5) [1.8] 19.3 (1.9) [2.0] 7.9 (2.6) [1.9]
dependents 0 −4.1 (1.7) [5.3] 3.5 (1.7) [4.9] −4.5 (2.0) [4.8]
dependents 1 7.2 (2.1) [2.9] 2.1 (2.3) [2.8] 12.5 (2.9) [2.1]
dependents 2 8.4 (2.7) [2.0] −3.1 (2.6) [2.3] 1.2 (2.8) [2.0]
dependents 3 3.1 (7.0) [0.5] −9.6 (5.4) [0.7] −2.5 (7.0) [0.5]
dependents 4 28.9 (10.5) [0.1] 5.6 (17.7) [0.2] 43.4 (7.1) [0.1]
dependents 5 48.1 (18.4) [0.1] 38.2 (25.9) [0.1] 12.0 (37.0) [0.1]
education up to secondary 6.2 (1.6) [5.8] 10.6 (1.5) [6.0] 2.7 (2.1) [4.6]
education post-secondary 8.0 (1.5) [2.4] 3.8 (1.7) [2.1] 3.6 (1.9) [1.9]
education tertiary education 29.6 (2.5) [2.5] 22.8 (2.7) [2.9] 27.7 (2.4) [3.0]
sex male 4.1 (1.0) [4.9] 0.0 (0.8) [4.9] 2.4 (1.1) [4.3]
sex female −3.0 (0.8) [6.0] 0.3 (0.7) [6.1] −1.8 (1.0) [5.3]
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in the parenthesis. Number of observations in thousands in brackets.
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. Except for education, labour market characteristics of the household are more impor-
tant in explaining inequality than demographics. For example, the different number
of people working, the main source of income of the household, and the occupation
individually explain 5–10 Gini points. The between-contribution, when grouping
people according to activity status is 7 Gini points. This means that if all household
members were employed and would earn employment income, the Gini coefficient
would fall by 7 points and become similar to the EU Gini coefficient. This between-con-
tribution in Lithuania is about 2 times higher than the EU between-contribution, indi-
cating that employment is much more important in terms of income in Lithuania
than in the EU. Low redistribution (low taxes and transfers) in Lithuania could explain
why it is very costly to not participate in the labour market (IMF, 2016; Lazutka,
2017). Furthermore, the number of those employed within a household matter in
Lithuania. Demographic characteristics (age, number of dependents, sex) determine a
relatively lower share (0.2–1.4 of Gini).
The within, between and stratification decomposition is decomposed further to reveal
the importance of the employed to income inequality each year from 2005 to 2015.
Specifically, the within-contribution of activity status is decomposed to the within contri-
bution of the employed, unemployed, and non-participants. This decomposition, along
with the between and stratification contributions, is shown in Table 10 for Lithuania.
Table 9. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient in 2015.
Grouping Decomposition EU new EU states old EU states LT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
activity status between 3.3 (0.2) [47.5] 3.8 (0.3) [18.7] 3.1 (0.2) [28.8] 7.0 (0.5) [9.5]
activity status stratification −1.7 (0.1) [47.5] −1.9 (0.2) [18.7] −1.6 (0.1) [28.8] −3.5 (0.3) [9.5]
activity status within 29.2 (0.3) [47.5] 29.3 (0.5) [18.7] 29.2 (0.3) [28.8] 33.4 (0.7) [9.5]
nr working between 3.5 (0.2) [47.9] 3.5 (0.3) [19.0] 3.5 (0.2) [28.9] 10.1 (0.7) [9.6]
nr working stratification −1.8 (0.1) [47.9] −1.7 (0.2) [19.0] −1.8 (0.1) [28.9] −5.0 (0.4) [9.6]
nr working within 29.1 (0.3) [47.9] 29.3 (0.5) [19.0] 29.0 (0.3) [28.9] 31.9 (0.8) [9.6]
main income between 1.1 (0.1) [47.9] 2.9 (0.3) [19.0] 0.8 (0.1) [28.9] 8.4 (0.7) [9.6]
main income stratification −0.5 (0.1) [47.9] −1.4 (0.2) [19.0] −0.4 (0.1) [28.9] −4.1 (0.4) [9.6]
main income within 30.2 (0.3) [47.9] 29.6 (0.5) [19.0] 30.2 (0.3) [28.9] 32.6 (0.7) [9.6]
occupation between 4.6 (0.2) [41.1] 5.3 (0.4) [16.2] 4.5 (0.3) [24.9] 5.5 (0.7) [8.6]
occupation stratification −2.4 (0.1) [41.1] −2.6 (0.2) [16.2] −2.4 (0.2) [24.9] −2.8 (0.4) [8.6]
occupation within 28.0 (0.3) [41.1] 27.5 (0.5) [16.2] 28.0 (0.3) [24.9] 34.1 (0.7) [8.6]
sector between 1.9 (0.2) [21.2] 4.2 (0.5) [8.5] 1.5 (0.2) [12.7] 1.2 (0.5) [4.5]
sector stratification −1.0 (0.1) [21.2] −2.1 (0.3) [8.5] −0.7 (0.1) [12.7] −0.5 (0.3) [4.5]
sector within 27.9 (0.4) [21.2] 27.7 (0.7) [8.5] 27.8 (0.4) [12.7] 32.4 (0.9) [4.5]
age bracket between 0.4 (0.1) [47.9] 0.3 (0.1) [19.0] 0.4 (0.1) [28.9] 1.4 (0.2) [9.6]
age bracket stratification −0.1 (0.1) [47.9] −0.1 (0.1) [19.0] −0.2 (0.1) [28.9] −0.5 (0.1) [9.6]
age bracket within 30.6 (0.3) [47.9] 30.8 (0.5) [19.0] 30.5 (0.3) [28.9] 36.1 (0.8) [9.6]
dependents between 0.8 (0.1) [47.9] 1.6 (0.3) [19.0] 0.7 (0.1) [28.9] 1.1 (0.4) [9.6]
dependents stratification −0.4 (0.1) [47.9] −0.7 (0.1) [19.0] −0.3 (0.1) [28.9] −0.4 (0.2) [9.6]
dependents within 30.4 (0.3) [47.9] 30.2 (0.5) [19.0] 30.4 (0.3) [28.9] 36.3 (0.8) [9.6]
education between 3.4 (0.2) [47.2] 4.6 (0.3) [18.7] 3.2 (0.2) [28.5] 5.9 (0.6) [9.5]
education stratification −1.8 (0.1) [47.2] −2.3 (0.2) [18.7] −1.7 (0.1) [28.5] −3.1 (0.4) [9.5]
education within 29.2 (0.3) [47.2] 28.9 (0.5) [18.7] 29.2 (0.3) [28.5] 34.2 (0.7) [9.5]
sex between 0.0 (0.1) [47.9] 0.1 (0.1) [19.0] 0.0 (0.1) [28.9] 0.2 (0.1) [9.6]
sex stratification 0.0 (0.0) [47.9] 0.0 (0.0) [19.0] 0.0 (0.0) [28.9] −0.1 (0.0) [9.6]
sex within 30.8 (0.3) [47.9] 31.0 (0.5) [19.0] 30.7 (0.3) [28.9] 36.9 (0.8) [9.6]
Notes: The first figure in columns (3–6) represents the contribution to Gini coefficient of equivalised household disposable
income. Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in the parenthesis. Number of observations are shown in thousands in
brackets.
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The rise in disposable income household inequality in Lithuania since 2011 can be primar-
ily explained by a rise in income inequality among those who are employed. This is partly
determined by the fact that a larger share of the population has become employed since
the crisis (51% in 2011 and 55% in 2015), the employed are taking a larger share of income
(from 62% to 68%) and are themselves more unequally distributed (the within-Gini rose
from 29 to 33). To a lesser extent, inequality is also rising due to greater between-subgroup
inequality and stratification, especially stratification of the employed vis-a-vis other
groups. This is because average wages rose faster than non-labour income during this
period.
4. Structure of income inequality by income factors
We estimate the structure of income inequality by decomposing household disposable
income inequality by factors. Knowing which factors contribute to income inequality
help explain why income inequality in Lithuania is high. The four components of disposa-
ble income are labour income, capital income, transfers, and taxes (including social trans-
fers). These are further broken down by more granular income factors.
We use the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) method to decompose the Gini coefficient. It
allows decomposing Ĝ into income factors
∑K
k=1 T̂k , where k represents labour, capital,
transfers and taxes. We further decompose T̂k into (̂Rk/100)(̂Gk/100)̂Sk . Here R̂k is the esti-
mate of Gini correlation between household disposable income and factor k. The quantity
R̂k ranges between −100 and 100. The value R̂k = 100 refers to high positive correlation.
This means that households with a lot of factor k also have a lot of total disposable income,
while households with little factor k have small disposable income. If R̂k is close to −100, it
means that households with little disposable income tend to have larger factor k income.
Next, Ĝk represents the Gini index of factor k and is approaching 100 if inequality of k is
high. Finally, component Ŝk is the share of factor k of the household disposable income,
meaning that factors which constitute a larger share of income matter more for inequality.
More details on this method are provided in Appendix 2. We provide the estimates for
Lithuania and the EU. Unfortunately, 4 countries, including Germany, did not provide all
Table 10. Decomposition of the first differences of the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable
income in Lithuania in 2015.
year employed unemployed other between stratification sum
2005 −0.80 −0.30 −0.20 −0.30 0.00 −1.60
2006 −0.20 −0.50 −0.40 0.20 −0.10 −1.00
2007 0.70 0.00 0.40 −0.50 0.20 0.80
2008 0.40 0.30 0.70 −0.20 0.20 1.40
2009 0.20 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90
2010 −4.10 0.60 −0.40 0.00 0.20 −3.70
2011 −0.50 −0.70 −0.20 0.60 −0.40 −1.20
2012 2.30 −0.10 0.60 −0.10 −0.10 2.60
2013 0.40 −0.20 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.40
2014 2.80 0.10 −0.20 0.50 −0.30 2.90
2015 −1.00 0.10 −0.30 0.40 −0.20 −1.00
Notes: The sum indicates the first differences of the Gini coefficient, while other columns show the contribution. In 2014,
the Gini rose by 2.9 Gini points and 2.8 Gini points are explained by the change in the contribution of the employed.
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the necessary income factors, meaning that the data sample for the EU differs from the
previous analysis.
Table 11 reveals the results for the decomposition of disposable income into T̂k for
Lithuania and the EU by factors and the further decomposition into R̂kĜk̂Sk is available
in Table 12.
. Labour income contributes most to income inequality in Lithuania. It contributes 53.63
Gini points to total inequality. Labour income contributes most to income inequality on
the EU level as well, yet about 9.72 Gini points less than in Lithuania. The labour com-
ponent is especially large as it includes an employer’s social insurance contributions.
Capital contributes only 1.32 and transfers and taxes reduce income inequality by
0.25 and 17.74 points respectively.
. All labour sub-factors contributions are larger in Lithuania than in new and old EU
states. The largest sub-factor contribution is employee income in Lithuania (34.48
Gini points). The contribution is about 0.58 Gini points higher than in the new
EU states and 4.42 higher than in the old EU states. Self-employed contribute
less to inequality in Lithuania (9.29 Gini points). However, this is by 6.23 Gini
points more than in new EU states and by 3.32 Gini points more than in the
old EU states.
. Labour income has a greater contribution in Lithuania than in the EU largely because
this income is more correlated with disposable income in Lithuania. In other words,
Table 11. Factor decomposition of the Gini coefficient in 2015 by labour, capital, transfers, taxes and
their sub-factors.
Variable EU new EU states old EU states LT
Gini 30.86 (0.30) 30.55 (0.44) 30.88 (0.38) 36.96 (0.76)
Labour 43.91 (0.63) 42.51 (0.78) 44.25 (0.8) 53.63 (1.28)
employment 30.95 (0.52) 33.90 (0.78) 30.06 (0.65) 34.48 (1.18)
employer’s social insurance contribution 7.52 (0.17) 5.47 (0.16) 8.03 (0.20) 9.67 (0.38)
self-employment 5.27 (0.36) 3.06 (0.33) 5.97 (0.45) 9.29 (0.86)
company car 0.16 (0.02) 0.09 (0.01) 0.18 (0.03) 0.19 (0.05)
income received by people aged under 16 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)
Capital 2.76 (0.26) 0.96 (0.13) 3.29 (0.34) 1.32 (0.29)
interests, dividends, etc. 1.63 (0.23) 0.48 (0.09) 1.96 (0.29) 1.11 (0.28)
rental income 1.13 (0.09) 0.49 (0.08) 1.32 (0.11) 0.20 (0.05)
Transfers 4.66 (0.27) 2.56 (0.30) 5.24 (0.34) −0.25 (0.30)
old-age benefits 5.07 (0.26) 3.28 (0.28) 5.62 (0.33) −0.44 (0.25)
unemployment 0.19 (0.07) 0.02 (0.03) 0.20 (0.09) 0.04 (0.06)
survivor benefits 0.28 (0.06) −0.04 (0.07) 0.37 (0.07) −0.12 (0.03)
sickness benefits 0.06 (0.01) 0.10 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.47 (0.05)
education-related allowances −0.04 (0.01) −0.01 (0.02) −0.05 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
family/children related allowances −0.37 (0.04) −0.18 (0.07) −0.43 (0.05) 0.41 (0.15)
disability benefits −0.11 (0.03) −0.26 (0.07) −0.06 (0.04) 0.03 (0.11)
social exclusion −0.28 (0.02) −0.18 (0.02) −0.32 (0.03) −0.41 (0.05)
housing allowances −0.23 (0.02) −0.05 (0.01) −0.3 (0.02) −0.03 (0.00)
regular inter-household cash transfers received 0.00 (0.06) 0.02 (0.04) −0.01 (0.08) −0.12 (0.05)
regular inter-household cash transfers paid −0.14 (0.03) −0.20 (0.08) −0.12 (0.02) −0.09 (0.04)
individual private pension 0.24 (0.04) 0.06 (0.01) 0.29 (0.05) 0.02 (0.01)
Taxes −20.46 (0.31) −15.49 (0.32) −21.89 (0.39) −17.74 (0.67)
tax on income and social insurance contributions −12.79 (0.20) −9.98 (0.25) −13.69 (0.24) −8.03 (0.30)
employer’s social insurance contribution −7.52 (0.17) −5.47 (0.16) −8.03 (0.20) −9.67 (0.38)
regular taxes on wealth −0.15 (0.01) −0.04 (0.01) −0.17 (0.02) −0.04 (0.01)
Note: Bootstraped standard errors are provided in the parentheses.
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those who get a lot of labour income tend to be the richest households in terms of dis-
posable income also. This is seen from R̂, the value of which is equal to 90.61 in Lithua-
nia, while it is under 79.58 in new EU states and 74.38 in old EU states. This is especially
true for the self-employed: R̂ is equal to 70.11 and this is 25.46 points more compared to
the EU. High R̂ means that self-employment income is especially important for self-
employed households. This may give rise to concern, as such income is generally less
stable than employment income. In contrast, for the labour income, Ĝ in Lithuania is
similar to Ĝ observed in other EU countries while Ŝ is only slightly larger.
. Taxes (and social contributions) negatively contribute to income inequality in Lithuania.
Specifically, taxes reduce income inequality by 17.74 Gini points. This reduction is a
couple of percentage points less than the EU and the old EU states in particular. The
biggest difference is a lower Ŝ, which means that taxes constitute a smaller share of dis-
posable income in Lithuanian than in the EU.
. Transfers seem to not contribute to income inequality in Lithuania. Specifically, transfers
contribute −0.25 Gini points. At first this may seem surprising, as transfers are known to
be of much greater effect in reducing income inequality (see, e.g. Joumard et al., 2013).
However, it would be more correct to say that transfers do not contribute to inequality –
i.e. they are not a part of the structure of inequality, instead of saying that transfers do
not affect inequality. On the contrary, transfers can have a large effect. Upon closer
inspection, we see the low contribution is due to a low R̂ which equals−1.84 for Lithua-
nia. Upon multiplying R̂ by Ĝ and Ŝ, the inequality contribution is close to zero. There-
fore, the larger the Ŝ going to transfers, the lower the inequality. Since transfers do not
Table 12. Factor decomposition of the of Gini of disposable income in 2015.
Variable Contribution EU new EU states old EU states LT
Labour T 43.91 (0.63) 42.51 (0.78) 44.25 (0.8) 53.63 (1.28)
Labour R 75.55 (0.59) 79.58 (0.63) 74.38 (0.75) 90.61 (0.48)
Labour G 52.7 (0.35) 49.26 (0.53) 53.66 (0.43) 52.22 (0.91)
Labour S 110.28 (0.67) 108.47 (0.74) 110.87 (0.86) 113.35 (1.13)
employee T 30.95 (0.52) 33.9 (0.78) 30.06 (0.65) 34.48 (1.18)
employee R 70.43 (0.66) 75.68 (0.8) 68.87 (0.84) 81.44 (1.13)
employee G 56.49 (0.37) 53.9 (0.59) 57.37 (0.46) 55.16 (0.93)
employee S 77.8 (0.6) 83.12 (0.82) 76.07 (0.73) 76.77 (1.24)
self-employment T 5.27 (0.36) 3.06 (0.33) 5.97 (0.45) 9.29 (0.86)
self-employment R 44.65 (1.84) 30.06 (2.51) 48.5 (2.14) 70.11 (2.44)
self-employment G 92.06 (0.41) 89.43 (0.39) 92.73 (0.51) 91.13 (0.58)
self-employment S 12.82 (0.43) 11.39 (0.46) 13.28 (0.54) 14.53 (1.01)
Capital T 2.76 (0.26) 0.96 (0.13) 3.29 (0.34) 1.32 (0.29)
Capital R 67.94 (2.14) 68.24 (3.15) 67.87 (2.33) 76.41 (5.08)
Capital G 92.89 (0.33) 98.06 (0.14) 90.92 (0.44) 98.13 (0.29)
Capital S 4.37 (0.28) 1.44 (0.13) 5.32 (0.36) 1.75 (0.31)
Transfer T 4.66 (0.27) 2.56 (0.3) 5.24 (0.34) −0.25 (0.3)
Transfer R 21.22 (1.07) 13.35 (1.45) 22.98 (1.28) −1.84 (2.23)
Transfer G 66.88 (0.35) 64.69 (0.74) 67.27 (0.41) 57.26 (0.86)
Transfer S 32.84 (0.4) 29.65 (0.52) 33.87 (0.5) 23.47 (0.66)
Tax T −20.46 (0.31) −15.49 (0.32) −21.89 (0.39) −17.74 (0.67)
Tax R 80.78 (0.47) 78.28 (0.65) 81.43 (0.56) 81.03 (1.14)
Tax G 53.35 (0.37) 50.02 (0.56) 53.7 (0.45) 56.75 (0.94)
Tax S −47.49 (0.35) −39.56 (0.3) −50.07 (0.42) −38.57 (0.71)
Notes: G is decomposed into income factors
∑4
k=1 Tk , where k represents labour, capital, transfers and taxes. We further
decompose Tk into (Rk/100)(Gk/100)Sk . Here Rk is the Gini correlation between household disposable income and factor
k that ranges between −100 and 100. The component Gk represents the Gini index of factor k and Sk is the share of factor
k of the household disposable income. Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in the parentheses.
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contribute to inequality and taxes reduce inequality, their relative effect on inequality is
not comparable using this method. This leads us to Section 5 which discusses their rela-
tive effects.
5. Marginal and redistribute effect of taxes and transfers on income
inequality in Lithuania
In this section, we answer how much do transfers and taxes affect income inequality. We do
so first by calculating the marginal effects: how does inequality respond to a percent change
in an increase in taxes or transfers. Second, we estimate the redistributive effect of taxes and
public transfers. Specifically, we analyse two ways in which taxes and public transfers can
affect income inequality: by increasing their progressivity and their rate.
We use the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) decomposition to shed light on the marginal
contribution of each income factor to the Gini coefficient. We calculate the amount by
which the Gini changes if we raise the factor contribution by a small value ek and hold
other income factors constant. This is approximately equal to evaluating how many Gini
points will the Gini coefficient change if we increase an income factor by 1%. The
formula (A6) in Appendix 2 quantifies the effects. If all income factors are raised by the
same ek = e, the Gini would not change, as summarized in the first row of Table 13.
Table 13 shows the marginal contributions to the Gini for Lithuania and the EU. Several
conclusions can be drawn on taxes and transfers as well as labour and capital income.
. Transfers and taxes reduce income inequality. Raising transfers by 1% reduces inequal-
ity by 0.0892 Gini points while raising taxes (including social contributions) reduces
income inequality by 0.0348 Gini points. Additionally, raising transfers has a larger
effect in Lithuania than in the EU. Increasing old-age transfers alone would reduce
inequality by 0.0544 Gini points – three times more than in the EU. Other transfers
have a much smaller impact individually. Taxes, however, have less effect in Lithuania
than in the EU, especially the old EU states. Specifically, a 1% rise in income taxes and
social contributions paid by the household reduces inequality by 0.0348 Gini points –
about half of the impact in the old EU states, which is 0.0643. However, the tax situation
in Lithuania is very similar to that of new EU states.
. Raising labour income would result in higher inequality in Lithuania and the effect is
stronger for Lithuania than for the EU. A 1% increase in labour income means a
0.1147 rise in income inequality in Lithuania. This is almost 0.02 Gini points more
than in the EU. The reason why inequality would rise more in Lithuania than in the
EU is self-employment income. A 1% rise in self-employed income raises income
inequality by 0.0391 Gini points in Lithuania as compared to 0.0131 Gini points in
the EU. Raising employment income would raise income inequality by similar
amounts in both economies.
The reasons why raising old-age benefits reduces inequality in Lithuania more than in
the EU are most likely related to the design of the pension systems in Lithuania and the EU.
First, the social expenditure on pensions in Lithuania is lower than in the EU (Lis, 2018).
Because of this, the retired have lower incomes as compared to the rest of the population
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and this difference is larger than for the EU (see Table 3). This means that any transfers to
this group will on average reduce inequality more in Lithuania. Second, the old-age
benefits that are handed out in Lithuania depend on previous contributions but are not
very elastic to it. This means that the old-age benefits are relatively equally distributed
amongst the retired and perhaps more so than in other countries. As a consequence,
the retired are relatively more equal amongst themselves (see Table 5) as compared to
inequality within other activity status groups. Therefore, increasing the income share of
the pensioners, the most equal subgroup in society, will reduce overall income inequality
also. However, whether the pensions in other EU countries are more or less elastic to pre-
vious contributions than Lithuania remains to be tested.
Table 13. Marginal decomposition of the Gini coefficient in 2015 by labour, capital, transfers, taxes and
their sub-factors.
Variable EU new EU states old EU states LT
Gini 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Labour 0.0987 (0.0038) 0.0938 (0.0038) 0.1001 (0.0049) 0.1174 (0.0062)
employment 0.0694 (0.0035) 0.0851 (0.0042) 0.0657 (0.0043) 0.0611 (0.0072)
employer’s social insurance contribution 0.0155 (0.0011) 0.0126 (0.0011) 0.0149 (0.0013) 0.0161 (0.0023)
self-employment 0.0131 (0.0025) −0.0042
(0.0026)
0.0187 (0.0032) 0.0391 (0.005)
company car 0.0008 (0.0001) 0.0005 (0.0001) 0.0008 (0.0002) 0.001 (0.0003)







Capital 0.0141 (0.0017) 0.0052 (0.0009) 0.0164 (0.0022) 0.0067 (0.0018)
interests, dividends, etc. 0.0087 (0.0015) 0.0028 (0.0006) 0.0102 (0.0019) 0.0063 (0.0018)

























































































regular inter-household cash transfers paid 0.0010 (0.0003) 0.0007 (0.0008) 0.0011 (0.0003) 0.0007 (0.0004)



























regular taxes on wealth 0.0014 (0.0001) 0.0009 (0.0001) 0.0017 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0001)
Note: Bootstraped standard errors are provided in the parentheses.
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Similarly, the reasons why raising tax income would reduce income inequality in Lithua-
nia less than in the EU is likely related to the design of the respective tax and social con-
tribution systems. Lithuania’s social contribution constitutes over 3/4 labour taxes. But
they are not progressive. The social contribution rates are flat without a ceiling and are
therefore not redistributive among those who pay the contributions. Income tax constitu-
tes just a quarter of labour taxes and, apart from a non-taxable minimum, has been non-
progressive in 2005–2015 either. This means that while raising taxes will bring those with
labour income closer to those without labour income, it will not reduce income inequality
amongst those who have labour income.
The reason why raising labour income results in more inequality in Lithuania than in the
EU may also be related to the tax system and tax evasion. In Lithuania, the self-employed
benefited from a lower taxable base. Additionally, the self-employed seem to evade taxes
more often than employed in Lithuania (Černiauskas & Jousten, 2020). As a result, there is
very little redistribution for the self-employed taking place in Lithuania. Given that self-
employment income is effectively not taxed, it correlates so well with disposable
income and the Gini correlation coefficient R̂ was so high in Table 12.
Next, we estimate the redistributive effect of taxes and public transfers for the total
population and self-employed separately. We follow Joumard et al. (2013), which is
based on Kakwani (1977). This method also lets us decompose the redistribution effect
into the progressivity and average rate of taxes or public transfers in Lithuania and
compare these figures with the ones in the EU.
For i denoting taxes or transfers, the redistributive effect is decomposed as follows
(Joumard et al., 2013):
redistributioni = ri100 progressivityi , (2)
takes the values from −100 to 100, where −100 indicates regressive i and 100 indicates
progressive i.
Specifically, we apply the following calculations to get the average rate ri and the pro-
gressivity index. To compute rtax , we divide the total taxes paid by the disposable income
of the population and multiply by 100. To compute rtransfers, we divide the public transfers
received by the market income after transfers of the population and multiply by 100. To
compute progressivitytax , we subtract the concentration coefficient of market income
after public transfers from the concentration coefficient of taxes. To compute the
progressivitytransfers, we subtract the concentration coefficient of public transfers from the
concentration coefficient of market income. The concentration coefficient is familiar to
the Gini index. Like the Gini index, it is computed using (A1), where y represents the vari-
ables tax or transfers. However, tax, transfers, and survey weights are sorted according to
market income. It is also possible to sort by disposable income. In that case, the progres-
sivity measures would be much smaller. However, we prefer sorting by market income,
because we see the Lithuanian and EU system as transferring to and taxing from house-
holds primarily based on their market incomes.
The redistributive effects of taxes with social security contributions are similar to the
redistributive effects of public transfers for Lithuania. The effects on the Gini of market
income, as well as the components of the effects, are available in Table 14 for Lithuania
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and the EU in 2015. Both taxes and public transfers have a very similar effect on redistri-
buting incomes. Interestingly, taxes excluding employer’s social insurance contributions
contribute much less to income redistribution in Lithuania and the EU. Since other
studies typically disregard employer’s social contributions, it could explain why they
find taxes to be playing a small role in redistribution (see, e.g. Causa & Hermansen,
2017; OECD, 2011).
Taxes have a high redistributive effect because of the average tax rate, while public trans-
fers have a high effect because of their progressiveness in Lithuania. The average tax rate
constitutes 38.6% of disposable income which is more than double the public transfer
rates (16.7% of market income after transfers). However, taxes are much less progressive
(31.4%) as compared to public transfers (78.7%). This means that raising tax progressivity
will have a higher impact on reducing income inequality than raising public transfer pro-
gressivity, while raising the average public transfer rate will have a higher effect on
income inequality than raising the average tax rate in Lithuania and, similarly, in the EU.
The redistributive effects of public transfers and taxes are much lower in Lithuania than
in the EU. The redistributive impact of taxes in Lithuania is almost two times smaller than in
the EU, while public transfers are about 50% smaller. All the subcomponents are smaller.
Tax progressivity and the average rate of public transfers in particular are lower in Lithua-
nia as compared to the EU.
The tax system is much less distributive amongst the self-employed in Lithuania. The
redistributive effect of taxes is negative in Lithuania as shown in Table 15. This means
that the poorer households pay a larger share of their disposable income in taxes than
the richer households. This is in line with previous findings (Černiauskas & Jousten,
2020). We additionally see that this is very different when compared to the EU, wherein
taxes do have a positive redistributive effect. Additionally, the average tax rate of the
self-employed for Lithuania is less than a third of the EU and almost a quarter of the tax
rates of the old EU states. Therefore, negative tax progressivity can explain why the self-
employed contribute more to inequality in Lithuania than in other EU states.
The results suggest that raising tax progressivity and the average rate of public transfers
should reduce income inequality most. We run a simulation (for the full population) to
Table 14. Progressivity index for market incomes in 2015.
EU new EU states old EU states LT
Redistributive effect of public transfers 19.8 18.5 20.2 13.2
Redistributive effect of taxes 23.9 16.3 26.8 12.1
Redistributive effect of taxes without ESCa 8.9 7.1 9.6 3.8
Average tax rate 47.8 41.2 50.1 38.6
Average public transfer rate 21.9 21.3 22.1 16.7
Tax progressivity index 50.0 39.6 53.5 31.4
Public transfers progressivity index 90.6 86.9 91.7 78.7
Notes: The redistributive effects of public transfers and taxes are calculated by multiplying their progressivity index with the
average rates as in (2). To compute the average tax rate, we divide the taxes paid by the disposable income of the popu-
lation. To compute the average public transfer rate we divide the public transfers received by the market income after
public transfers of the population. To compute the progressivity of taxes, we subtract the concentration coefficient of
market income after public transfers from the concentration coefficient of taxes. To compute the progressivity of
public transfers, we subtract the concentration coefficient of public transfers from the concentration coefficient of
market income. Tax progressivity is measured using the Kakwani index, where 100 is a very progressive Tax system
and −100 is a very regressive tax system. The same is applied to transfers.
aESC – employer’s social insurance contributions.
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observe this. We simulate the effect of increasing the average rate and changing the pro-
gressivity of taxes and public transfers on Lithuania using EU-SILC data. The effect of chan-
ging the progressivity or average rate of tax and public transfers on the Gini of Lithuania is
illustrated in Figure 2. We simulate the average rate of taxes by increasing the taxes for all
those who are currently paying taxes. We do a similar simulation for public transfers. We
increase taxes and transfers by up to 5 percentage points of market income after public
transfers. We increase the progressivity of taxes by increasing taxes by up to 5 percentage
points for the top quintile of households that are sorted by market incomes and redistri-
buting this gain to all other quintiles. The redistribution is also progressive. For example, if
we were to increase taxes on the top quintile by 10%, then the 4th quintile will get to pay
about 10% fewer taxes, the third will pay 20% less, the second 30% less and the first will
Table 15. Progressivity index for market incomes in 2015 for self-employed.
EU new EU states old EU states LT
Redistributive effect of transfers 1.3 1.9 1.1 2.0
Redistributive effect of taxes 4.9 1.7 5.6 −1.3
Redistributive effect of taxes without ESCa 7.5 4.0 8.1 −0.5
Tax progressivity index 12.4 6.4 12.8 −11.3
Transfers progressivity index 19.1 20.5 17.1 25.8
Average tax rate 39.0 26.1 43.9 11.1
Average transfer rate 7.0 9.2 6.2 7.8
Notes: The redistributive effects of public transfers and taxes are calculated by multiplying their progressivity index with the
average rates as in (2). To compute the average tax rate, we divide the taxes paid by the disposable income of the popu-
lation. To compute the average public transfer rate we divide the public transfers received by the market income after
public transfers of the population. To compute the progressivity of taxes, we subtract the concentration coefficient of
market income after public transfers from the concentration coefficient of taxes. To compute the progressivity of
public transfers, we subtract the concentration coefficient of public transfers from the concentration coefficient of
market income. Tax progressivity is measured using the Kakwani index, where 100 is a very progressive Tax system
and −100 is a very regressive tax system. The same is applied to transfers.
aESC – employer’s social insurance contributions.
Figure 2. Simulating the effect of changes in progressivity and average rate of tax and public transfers
on the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income in Lithuania.
162 N. ČERNIAUSKAS AND A. ČIGINAS
pay 40% less. A scalar is added so that the reduction in taxes for the four bottom quintiles
equals the increase in taxes for the top quantile. We increase the progressivity of public
transfers by increasing transfers received by up to 5 percentage points for the bottom
quintile of households that are sorted by market incomes and redistributing the cost to
all other quintiles in a similar manner as for taxes. The simulations confirm that increasing
the average rate of public transfers has a much higher effect on the Gini than raising taxes
by the same amount. Increasing tax progressivity has a larger effect than increasing public
transfer progressivity.
6. Conclusions
We have tackled three questions and each of them is elaborated in this study. We have
also suggested possible improvements for future studies.
First, we have run three statistical tests and found that equivalised income inequality in
Lithuania is in all cases one of the highest in the EU. Specifically, we have tested for accu-
racy of estimates by estimating their standard errors, the inequality measure used as well
as different equivalence scales. In all cases, equivalised income inequality in Lithuania is
found to be one of the highest across the EU.
Second, we have investigated why equivalised income inequality in Lithuania is higher
compared to the EU by using univariate decomposition techniques. We have found large
inequalities between and within many groups of households in the country. In all cases,
the within-group inequality contributes more to equivalised income inequality in Lithua-
nia and the EU. It means that this inequality is higher within households of similar obser-
vable characteristics rather than between households of different characteristics.
Inequalities within the unemployed and those working in the agricultural sector are
especially prominent. Nevertheless, between-contributions are also significant for Lithua-
nia, suggesting where policy can look into deeper. The largest between-group inequalities
lie between the employed and the rest of the population. Moreover, this type of inequality
has been rising over time. As the factor decomposition shows, the large between-group
inequality contribution can be explained by unequal distribution of labour income,
especially – self-employment income.
Third, we analysed the extent to which equivalised income inequalities stemming
from the market income are offset by taxes and transfers. Specifically, we analysed
the marginal and redistributive effects of Lithuania’s taxes and transfers and compared
this to the EU. The marginal decomposition of the Gini coefficient of equivalised dispo-
sable income by factors confirms that an increase in tax and transfer income reduces
equivalised income inequality while an increase in labour income increases it. The
way that the tax and transfer system is currently designed, the average marginal con-
tribution is more than twice higher for transfers compared to taxes, and that among the
transfers the role of the old-age pensions is the highest. Similarly, the analysis of the
redistributive effect of the taxes and public transfer income also showed that these
two income sources reduce income inequality. However, the redistributive impact of
taxes in Lithuania is almost two times smaller than in the EU, while public transfers
are about 50% smaller. The redistributive effect of taxes for the self-employed is nega-
tive in Lithuania and therefore reinforces income inequality, while taxes reduce
inequality amongst the self-employed in the EU. This means that the current tax
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system and tax evasion/avoidance of higher-income households are likely to be
responsible for a larger self-employment income contribution to inequality in Lithuania
as opposed to EU.
We also decomposed the redistributive effect into the progressivity and the average
rate of tax and public transfers effect. We find that the tax progressivity and the
average rate of public transfers in particular are lower in Lithuania as compared to the
EU. The results suggest that raising tax progressivity and the average rate of public trans-
fers would reduce equivalised income inequality most.
The estimates of equivalised income inequality may have several drawbacks. First, there
is a large shadow economy in Lithuania, with some estimates exceeding 25% of GDP in
2013 and 2015 (see Schneider, 2013; Žukauskas, 2016). Even though survey respondents
are informed that their data will not be used for tax purposes, some of them may still
be unwilling to disclose information on their true income received. It remains unclear
how this affects equivalised income inequality because it depends on the income distri-
bution within the shadow economy together with the income distribution of the observed
economy. Additionally, this estimate may cause problems when comparing households
across countries, since the size of the shadow economy is particularly large in Lithuania.
Second, as has been already pointed out various times, EU-SILC undersamples the
income of rich individuals in all countries (especially capital income (Navickė & Lazutka,
2018)) – something that the survey weights do not correct for. Including the rich will
result in higher measures of equivalised income inequality in Lithuania. However, equiva-
lised income inequality will rise in other EU countries as well. Therefore, the relative pos-
ition of Lithuania vis-a-vis other countries may not change so much. Nevertheless, the
alternative Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCN, 2019) could partly
correct for both of these shortcomings, as it has data on consumption, which can be
used to estimate the shadow economy and oversample the wealthy households for
Lithuania along with many other EU countries. Furthermore, greater access to administra-
tive data would be yet another path to take.
Future studies can also consider using an alternative methodology, for example, by
using multivariate techniques to decompose equivalised income inequality. This was
not the focus of the current study because the results of a multivariate decomposition
depend on all variables by which the Gini is decomposed, and there is no consensus on
which should be included. Furthermore, variables available to some countries are less
available in others in the EU-SILC. Nevertheless, our additional check using a multivariate
decomposition technique as in Social Situation Monitor (2017) does not contradict the
results. Additionally, one may look into income inequality between individuals instead
of households.
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Appendices
U = {1, . . . , N} is the set representing elements of the finite survey population, and y1, . . . , yN are
values of the variable of interest (income) in U . The subset s = {i1, . . . , in} of U is the sample,

































Here I{ · } stands for the indicator function. Estimators of the subgroup and factor decompositions
are constructed using similar plug-in principles.
Appendix 1. Subgroup decompositions
We give the decomposition of (A1) by groups as in Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991). Let s = s1 < · · ·< sL




wj , P̂l = N̂l
N̂















where N̂l is the estimated population size in the subgroup l, the quantity P̂l is the estimated popu-
lation share, m̂ is the estimated mean of the survey variable in U , m̂(l) is the estimated mean in the
subgroup, and F̂(l) is the estimate of the average of global ranks in the subgroup l. Consider the
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and










































Ŝl = P̂l m̂
(l)
m̂




Here the component Ŝl represents the share of the survey variable, Ĝl is the estimated within-group
Gini coefficient, and the part Q̂l is the estimated stratification term.
Appendix 2. Factor decompositions





i , where k is a factor of the survey variable. Consider the values F̂(yi) and F̂(y
(k)
i ), i [ s,
of distribution function (A2) and denote the expressions



























































, Ĝk = 2̂cov(y
(k), F(y(k)))
m̂(k)




Here R̂k is the estimate of the so-called Gini correlation between the survey variable and its kth com-
ponent, Ĝk represents the Gini index of factor k, and Ŝk is the share of factor. For a small change in the
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kth factor, the expression of marginal effects is
∂Ĝ
∂ek
= Ŝk (̂RkĜk − Ĝk), (A6)
see Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985).
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